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Abstract 
This article focuses on TV broadcasters adopting co-opetition strategies for launching online 
video services. It is claimed that the emergence of online video platforms like YouTube and 
Netflix is driving TV broadcasters to collaborate with their closest competitors to reduce costs 
and reach the necessary scale in the global marketplace. The article sheds light on online 
video  platforms that were developed following a co-opetition strategy (Hulu and YouView). 
The establishment of joint ventures in online video, however, has been scrutinised by 
competition authorities which fear that collaboration between close competitors lessens 
rivalry and reduces consumer choice. Therefore, several co-opetition projects (among others 
BBC’s Kangaroo and Germany’s Gold) have been prohibited by competition authorities. 
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Introduction 
These days, the impact of the Internet on the business models of private TV companies, either 
producers or aggregators, can hardly be overstated. Although television still stands as the 
most effective mass-audience advertising medium in most markets, Internet advertising is the 
fastest-growing category with double-digit growth all over the world. TV advertising may 
continue to benefit from steady viewing, but broadcasters’ high dependence on advertising 
makes them extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in economic activity. In the 2008-2009 
period, TV advertising income in Europe fell dramatically by 16 per cent due to economic 
recession (EAO, 2012). Hence, the industry has started looking for alternative and more stable 
income sources, most notably revenues from subscription services. In addition to pursuing 
(higher) retransmission payments from cable, satellite and IPTV operators (see Evens and 
Donders, 2013), TV broadcasters have launched streaming platforms to position themselves in 
the online video market, and capture a share of the economic value that is created in this 
burgeoning market (Waterman et al., 2013). 
Besides having access to a (potentially) lucrative revenue stream, the rationale behind 
launching proprietary video platforms is to team up with changing viewing patterns. Indeed, 
TV content becomes increasingly detached from the regular screen and distributed over 
multiple platforms and devices. As a consequence, programming is consumed through a wide 
array of screen technologies, at a moment and place determined by the viewer. In short, 
control over the program schedule is said to shift from television networks to the viewers 
(Mittell, 2011; Simons, 2013). TV companies have responded to convergence by migrating 
towards a diversified multi-platform approach to the production and distribution of content, 
maximising consumer value and returns through a multitude of outlets of which conventional 
TV is just, albeit still the most important, one (Doyle, 2010). Preliminary results suggest such 
multi-platform strategy pays off in terms of viewership. Ofcom (2012) reports that linear TV 
remains popular among viewers across the world, with minutes of viewing even increasing in 
most countries, and that many viewers switch to consume TV programmes via smartphones 
and tablets. 
Although it is impossible to accurately predict tomorrow’s business model for TV 
broadcasting and distribution, there is, however, little doubt that the future value creation 
models in digital TV will fundamentally differ from those applied in analogue industries 
(Evens, 2010). Hence, the article focuses on the fundamental organisational change that the 
TV industry witnesses following the popularity of online video services. Taking a media 
business perspective, it is claimed that the entrance of disruptive platforms including iTunes 
and Netflix will drive the TV industry from a linear value chain to a burgeoning business 
ecosystem, and that cooperating with competitors – referring to the concept of ‘co-opetition’ – 
is particularly relevant for private TV broadcasters in online video markets. Furthermore, the 
article sheds light on how TV broadcasters have implemented co-opetition practices and 
business ecosystems in the online video market, and how regulatory agencies have 
investigated co-operative platforms by fear of anticompetitive conduct. The main conclusion 
is that although co-opetition strategies are highly useful for developing innovative video 
services they should be handled with ultimate care and in respect to existing competition 
policies so as to guarantee fair competition in the online video market. 
Theory framework 
Co-opetition: Sleeping with the enemy 
According to game theoretic models that are discussed in Industrial Organisation literature, a 
firm’s competitive strategy tends to follow a non-cooperative approach. Such approach 
involves strategic interactions in which a single firm has nothing to gain by changing its 
strategy unilaterally while its competitors keep theirs unchanged, ending up in what 
economists describe as the ‘Nash equilibrium’ (Peitz and Belleflamme, 2010). Theories on 
interaction between rivals either focus on competition or cooperation, but not on the 
combination of the two types of interaction that businesses can be involved in. In complex 
technology systems, however, relationships between competitors can take many forms, 
including strategic alliances, partnerships, joint ventures, service level agreements, technology 
licensing and so on. Webster (1992) presents a model of the relationship continuum, summing 
up the various forms of relationships competitors are involved in. Accordingly, relationships 
vary between a continuum, from pure market-based transactions at the one end to fully 
integrated hierarchical firms at the other end. Basically, the level and extent of cooperation 
increases along the presented continuum, with a more competitive attitude towards the 
exchange. Depending on the level of transaction costs, both types of control (market versus 
hierarchy) strive towards more economic efficiency. 
Whereas in the past competitors acted like in silos with almost no forms of cooperation and 
reciprocity, relationship management literature puts increasing emphasis on inter-firm 
relationships as a value generator and a source of competitive advantage (Day, 2000). Indeed, 
maintaining and managing inter-firm relationships with suppliers, complementors (third-
parties that add value to the company’s offer), competitors (substitutes) and even customers 
are of utmost importance for creating sustained competitive advantage. Increasingly, value is 
co-created by a series of partnerships and (exclusive) relationships in a value network, in 
which multiple parties join forces, innovate and co-produce value. Owing to the 
dematerialisation and delocalisation of industries, no single firm is capable of exploring and 
exploiting all competencies and resources required for the development of complex 
technology systems. Hence, (media) firms collaborate in order to share knowledge and access 
resources that are made available to the value network. In literature, collaboration is found to 
reduce financial and operational risks, reduce time to market, decrease the cost of product 
development, and provides access to new markets and technologies (Fjeldstad et al., 2012; 
Horvath, 2001). 
First coined by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), the concept of ‘co-opetition’ has 
become one of the most influential business perspectives in recent years, and has induced 
companies to fundamentally revise their management strategies. Bengtsson and Kock (2000) 
describe co-opetition as ‘the dyadic and paradoxical relationship that emerges when two firms 
cooperate in some activities, such as in a strategic alliance, and at the same time compete with 
each other in other activities’ (p. 412). Co-opetition thus implies a situation in which (media) 
firms simultaneously compete and collude, and benefit from such an ambivalent strategy. 
Whereas vertical relationships between buyers and suppliers are often built upon a mutual 
interest to interact, horizontal relationships between direct competitors are often conflicting. 
Nevertheless, co-opetition strategies are inherent in rapidly changing business dynamics and 
highly competitive ICT markets where rivals can emerge overnight and come up with 
disruptive business models. The formation of a successful co-opetition strategy, however, is 
not easy, and requires a governed distribution of power and control in order to ensure that all 
collaborating partners create maximum value (Jorde and Teece, 1989). 
Business ecosystems: Connecting strategic partners 
Even though initially co-opetition was seen as an extension of cooperation through strategic 
alliances and value networks, co-opetition became increasingly associated with ‘business 
ecosystems’ in which firms work co-operatively and competitively to develop innovative 
technology, launch new products and satisfy customer needs (Moore, 1993). Whereas value 
network theory focuses on a well-designed network of strategic partners and allies to 
determine firm performance, literature on business ecosystems involves a more holistic 
approach and claims that superior performance is derived from the ‘collective healthiness’ of 
a firm’s surrounding environment. In addition to the partner network, many external 
organisations – firm and non-firm institutions – directly affect, and are affected by, the 
creation and delivery of a company’s own offerings. A firm’s business ecosystem thus not 
only includes evident business partners (i.e. value network), but also contains competitors and 
institutions, including banks, regulators, policymakers, standardisation bodies and R&D 
centres that shape innovative capabilities (Fransman, 2010). As a result, innovation does not 
stand alone; rather does it depend on accompanying changes in the firm’s environment for its 
own success. These external changes, fuelled by innovation on the part of other actors, embed 
the firm within an ecosystem of interdependent innovations (Adner, 2006; Adner and Kapoor, 
2010). 
Business ecosystems can be understood as complex, adaptive systems of inter-firm 
interaction and tend to continuously adapt and evolve to internal and external mutations. 
Iansiti and Levien (2004) have used biological systems as a powerful analogy for 
understanding business ecosystems. Changes in the environmental conditions, such as a new 
regulatory framework, shifting consumption patterns or economic downturn, might cause a 
Schumpeterian earthquake to existing business ecosystems. As a result, dominant actors lose 
their leadership and previously niche players  move to the centre of the new ecosystem. 
Mature business ecosystems can be threatened by rising ecosystems that decide to attack the 
same product category or geographical market (Moore, 1993). Ecosystems that are successful 
over longer periods of time have institutionalised technological innovation, even at the risk of 
cannibalising legacy business models. This implies that ecosystems compete through business 
models and that firms need to adapt to changes in the external environment  in order to 
innovate business models successfully (Chesbrough, 2007). 
Keystone organisations play a critical role in the success of business ecosystems. 
Keystones are active leaders in the ecosystem and tend to improve the overall health of the 
ecosystem by providing a stable and predictable set of shared assets. Being a catalyst of 
innovation, keystones create and share value, and exercise power derived from their role of 
‘hubs’ in the network. Obviously, firms that hold gatekeeping positions in the ecosystem 
typically have a great deal of control over how the ecosystem performs and how the benefits 
are redistributed over the members (Rülke et al., 2003). However, keystones might become 
dominators, or ‘hub landlords’ that exploit their critical position to either take over the 
network or drain value from it. In emerging ecosystems, such aggressive behaviour might 
ultimately prove destructive and limit innovation. Dominators extract too much value from 
the network and leave little for complementors. Nevertheless, niche players often are 
responsible for the bulk of innovation in the ecosystem (Iansiti and Levien, 2004). Roles in an 
ecosystem are, however, not static and might evolve over time. Dominators might become 
niche players, and niche players might eventually become keystones for their own ecosystem. 
Collaboration: Public policy concerns 
Although strategic alliances and partnerships are well-established in media industries, such 
collaborative strategies often present a challenge for regulating agencies. In its purest form, a 
strategic alliance is an agreement between two or more parties to pursue a set of agreed upon 
objectives to improve their competitive position and performance. As strategic alliances 
generally take the form of an entirely new entity (joint venture), the collaborating 
organisations remain fully independent so that industrial competitiveness is not reduced (Hitt 
et al., 2011). This is also the case when no joint venture is established and businesses work 
together based on co-opetition agreements. Under particular conditions, however, co-opetition 
might give rise to anticompetitive concerns and trigger off regulatory intervention. In contrast 
to strategic alliances, collusive strategies could be used to reduce competition and therefore 
represent an illegal co-operative approach. Jorde and Teece (1990) suggest that the benefits of 
cooperation for technological innovation often outweigh anticompetitive concerns and that 
co-opetition enhances competition and consumer choice in the longer run. Nevertheless, it 
should be emphasised that only a small portion of co-opetition strategies constitute 
anticompetitive collusion (Hunt, 1997). 
Especially when large firms with substantial market power engage in co-opetition 
strategies, collaboration may raise public policy concerns. The idea behind market 
intervention is that co-opetition strategies may lead to collective dominance, establish a 
(quasi-)monopoly and diminish competition in the market. This would eventually result in 
reduced consumer choice and higher prices. Although an in-depth overview of competition 
law goes beyond the scope of the article, it is important to make a distinction between two 
types of collusion. First, explicit collusion occurs when two or more firms in a particular 
industry jointly agree to negotiate directly their strategic choices (relating to the amount of 
production and/or the price of the products sold) with the obvious aim of reducing rivalry in 
that industry. Firms using explicit collusive strategies may find competitors challenging their 
actions, and may find themselves guilty of ‘price coordination’. Second, tacit collusion exists 
when two or more firms indirectly coordinate their production and pricing decisions by 
observing each other’s competitive actions and responses. Rather than its outcome, the 
difference between explicit and tacit collusion is the lack of a formal procedure (e.g., 
company pricing or strategy documents) to communicate and settle on a particular collusive 
agreement. Owing to its indirect nature, tacit collusion may be hard to prove.  
Online video ecosystems  
As a result of the evolving strategic context of TV broadcasting and its distribution, partly 
fuelled by the ever-increasing penetration of the Internet and the popularity of social media 
platforms like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, the strategies of TV broadcasters to make 
money and yield profits in the digital industry largely differ from those deployed in analogue 
times (Alvarez-Monzoncillo, 2011). For many years, TV broadcasters acquired content 
further up the value chain, relied on proprietary terrestrial transmitters or managed deals with 
satellite and cable operators for passing programmes to the viewers, and sold these viewers to 
advertisers. Basically, the TV value chain was characterised by linearity and one-to-one 
relationships within the market. In recent years, however, the TV industry went through a 
fundamental transformation due to numerous reasons. Whereas deregulation and liberalisation 
allowed new competitors to enter the production and distribution stage of the industry, 
digitisation and convergence created a window of opportunities for innovative TV services 
and business models. As a consequence, the digital context of television production, 
distribution and consumption has evolved in a complex ecosystem that is characterised by the 
emergence of (potentially) disruptive business models and a hypercompetitive environment 
that incumbent multichannel operators can hardly control (Rangone and Turconi, 2003). 
As media convergence has paved the way for ICT companies from outside the TV industry 
to enter, the industry has expanded into a complex, multi-player environment. What once 
were separate sectors and strictly defined business roles have now been transformed into a 
converged ICT ecosystem marked by cross-sector competition. Because online video is 
rapidly rising in importance and revenues – forecasts estimate the global market will be worth 
about $37 billion by 2017, which is around 8 per cent of total television revenues – new 
parties like Amazon and Microsoft are attracted by this profitable industry (Given et al., 
2012). Although the online video market is concentrated among a few players, with iTunes, 
YouTube, Netflix and TV broadcasters, including Hulu, together accounting for about 70 per 
cent of all online video revenue, four kinds of players are now competing for a stake in this 
expanding market (see Figure 1). First, the TV ecosystem is populated by independent 
producers (HBO, Disney) and TV broadcasters (BBC, FOX) that are migrating towards a 
multi-platform approach to connect with the viewers (and advertisers). Second, CDN and 
service operators (Sky, Dish, Foxtel) are building TV Everywhere platforms to serve their pay-
TV subscribers across all screens. Third, online video aggregators (YouTube, Netflix) are 
expanding into global on-demand video libraries and adopt a ‘find, play and share’ approach. 
Fourth, CE vendors (Samsung, Nintendo) are becoming an entry point to access TV services 
and earn profits by selling connected devices (D’Arma, 2011; Evens, 2013). It is clear that for 
content providers and broadcasters the establishment of a successful multi-platform strategy 
depends upon a cooperative relationship between all these parties. 
 
Figure 1 Online video business ecosystem 
In such a digital TV ecosystem, TV firms generate value through business models that 
involve a complex set of exchange relationships and activities among multiple players. This 
implies that TV broadcasters not only need to secure distribution via mature outlets, but also 
need to liaise with emerging platforms that eventually bypass traditional TV distributors. The 
convergence of broadcast and Internet services, enhancing online video platforms and 
connected TV devices, requires TV broadcasters to build straight-forward relationships with 
numerous partners in the TV ecosystem to provide a compelling viewer experience 
(Venturini, 2011). Hence, the reconfiguration of business activities from value chain 
organisations to the fluid structure of an ecosystem, and the continuous efforts in fine-tuning 
business models to connect knowledge and relationships form the major strategic challenge 
for TV broadcasters. In the contemporary TV business, traditional bureaucratic hierarchical 
behemoths are replaced by new organisational forms, including strategic partnerships and 
networks that can be managed in a much more flexible manner (Jin, 2013). Indeed, TV firms 
are increasingly structured as ‘network organisations’ (Arsenault and Castells, 2008; 
Colapinto, 2010) whose competitive strategy is largely built upon partnerships and strategic 
alliances (Liu and Chan-Olmsted, 2003; Oba and Chan-Olmsted, 2007). 
Although not always successful, co-opetition seems one of the dominant strategies to build 
and sustain competitive advantage in the online video ecosystem these days. The network of 
strategic relationships, via distribution deals, content licensing agreements, revenue sharing 
contracts, advertising affiliation and/or cross-investments within the TV industry has never 
been no dense (Daidj and Jung, 2011). Faced by audience fragmentation and declining 
revenues from advertising, TV broadcasters start launching catch-up TV services. Co-
opetition forms an adequate strategy to share financial risks and reduce the substantial costs 
associated with the development of the expensive platform technology needed for these 
services. Moreover, content licensing deals with third-party platforms like YouTube and 
Netflix form a significant new revenue stream for TV broadcasters. Increasing rivalry in the 
online video market, and the enduring pressure to differentiate from competing platforms puts 
content producers and TV broadcasters in a powerful position to raise licensing income – 
Netflix’s licensing spending rose from $180 million to $1.98 billion between 2010 and 2012. 
In total, online video revenues (about $8 billion) are split 60/40 respectively between content 
producers and aggregators. This suggests that content producers and TV broadcasters are 
likely to play a leading role in the future TV ecosystem, especially as connected and mobile 
devices continue to push viewer behaviour towards multiscreen services and on-demand 
windows. Furthermore, partnerships with distribution platforms illustrate that co-opetition is 
not limited to joint ventures between TV broadcasters, but also opens up opportunities to ally 
with players from other stages in the media value chain (like distributors or CE 
manufacturers).     
Co-opetion strategies in online video 
The focus of the article is on TV broadcasters that decided to cooperate with their closest 
competitors in the TV ecosystem and establish a joint venture. However, it must be stressed 
that so far co-opetition in online video markets has not always produced satisfactorily results. 
In some cases, competition authorities, particularly in Europe, have prohibited joint ventures 
on competitive grounds (Richter, 2011). Table 1 provides a brief overview of recent joint 
ventures established in the online video market, and shows mixed evidence for co-opetition as 
a winning strategy. The German Bundeskartellamt has prohibited the establishment of a joint 
venture twice. In the case of Amazonas, the competition authority stated that the platform 
would strengthen the collective dominance of the broadcasters’ duopoly which controls over 
80 per cent of the German TV advertising market. In the remaining part of the article, two 
successful online video platforms (Hulu and YouView) that were established following a co-
opetition strategy will be discussed. 
Table 1 Overview of broadcasters’ online video joint ventures 
Year Country Project Partners Status 
     
2007 United States Hulu NBC/Comcast, Disney, FOX Running 
2009 United Kingdom Kangaroo BBC, ITV, Channel 4 Blocked 
2010 United Kingdom YouView BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Arqiva, BT, 
TalkTalk 
Running 
2011 Germany Amazonas RTL, ProSieben.Sat.1 Blocked 
2011 New Zealand Igloo Sky, TVNZ Running 
2013 Germany Germany’s 
Gold 
ZDF, ARD Blocked 
 
Hulu (US) 
Hulu is an advertisement-supported video streaming platform that provides subscription-free 
access to over 70,000 full-length movies and TV shows, and 2,300 TV series (from over 470 
content partners) – currently available in the US and Japan. Launched in 2007, Hulu forms a 
high-quality counterweight to YouTube and allows the TV networks to arm against online 
initiatives deployed by hardware manufacturers (iTunes, Google TV) and cable companies 
(e.g. TV Everywhere, a joint venture between Comcast and Time Warner Cable). In contrast 
to YouTube, US networks can run their full-length series and programmes, sell advertising 
and eventually share the revenues (about 70 per cent). Since the launch of Hulu Plus in 2010, 
the platform evolved to a subscription service ($7.99 per month). Like the free version of 
Hulu, the videos available on Hulu Plus also contain (limited) commercials. However, it 
offers subscribers an expanded content library in the form of full seasons and more episodes 
of shows already available through Hulu. Furthermore, Hulu Plus allows viewers to select 
shows and clips on a wide range of platforms, including smartphones, tablets, Smart TV, Blu-
ray players, game consoles and streaming players. In April 2013, Hulu announced its number 
of paid subscribers had doubled to 4 million (and more than 30 million monthly visitors), with 
revenues growing to $695 million up from $420 million. 
The Hulu venture was established in 2007 by NBC and FOX (with an initial investment of 
$1 billion), and later joined by Disney (ABC) and Providence Equity Partners (both invested 
about $100 million in Hulu). As Comcast inherited a 32 per cent stake in Hulu when the cable 
operator purchased control of NBC-Universal in 2011, NBC relinquished its Hulu board seat 
and agreed, as part of the federal approval of the merger, to become a silent partner in Hulu’s 
operations for seven years. In 2012, Providence sold its 10 per cent stake in Hulu for $200 
million, in a deal that valued the video platform at about $2 billion. Hulu’s ownership 
structure has become complex, with three TV networks financially controlling the company 
(it is estimated that FOX owns 36 per cent of the shares, and NBC and Disney each 32 per 
cent), but with only FOX and Disney in operational control. It is remarkable indeed that three 
closest rivals (for content, audiences and advertising) have cooperated in establishing an 
online video platform, and that CBS, the other ‘Big Four’ network, remains absent. The 
reason for that is that in 2008 CBS started its own platform named tv.com (later CBS 
Interactive) primarily as an online outlet for scheduling series and wants to keep CBS 
programming exclusive to its proprietary service. In 2012, the Hulu venture was put for sale 
but despite bids from interested parties including Google, Amazon, Yahoo, DirecTV and 
AT&T, all three shareholders decided to call off the auction and invest an extra $750 million 
in upgrading the platform to compete against other online distributors like Netflix and 
Amazon. 
Hulu’s ownership structure was challenged by NBC-Universal’s takeover by Comcast (in a 
deal worth $16.7 billion). Thanks to the merger, Comcast acquired control of NBC-Universal 
and turned into a vertically integrated cable operator. However, concerns grew about the 
merger’s potential anticompetitive effects as it would enable Comcast to restrict access to 
NBC programming available on Hulu and instead disfavour competing online video platforms 
to protect its own TV Everywhere service XFINITY. As the government was concerned that 
Comcast would try to impose restrictions on Hulu to protect its core cable business, it barred 
Comcast from being involved in Hulu’s business affairs. After lengthy investigation, both the 
Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission approved Comcast’s 
monumental purchase of NBC-Universal, imposing that Comcast must relinquish its 
management rights in Hulu and make NBC-Universal content available to Hulu that is 
comparable to the programming Hulu obtains from Disney and FOX. The example clearly 
illustrates the operational risks associated with a combined role of content provider and 
shareholder, which is different from regular companies where shareholders only have a vote 
at the board of governors, but not hold the leverage (like Amazon was owned by book 
publishers). In a joint venture where shareholders supply the raw materials, one obstinate 
strategic decision could result in one particular network pulling all its programming from 
Hulu and thereby destroying the company’s value. Once again, selecting trustworthy partners 
forms a main challenge in a co-opetition strategy. 
YouView (UK) 
YouView, formerly known as Project Canvas but rebranded in 2010, is a connected TV 
device offering access to terrestrial channels via Freeview (DTT) and Internet-delivered TV 
services (e.g. BBC iPlayer) via a hybrid set-top box connected with a broadband connection 
and/or television antenna. The box provides access to BBC One, BBC Two, ITV and Channel 
4 with the ability to record all Freeview channels via the EPG (with a backwards functionality 
and search engine). In addition, the on-demand players available are BBC iPlayer, 4oD, ITV 
Player, STV Player, Demand Five, Milkshake! and Now TV (premium, powered by Sky). 
Developing a common technical standard for Connected TV, the venture aims to create a 
horizontal market for consumer devices which utilise a common specification for on-demand 
services in the UK living room. The ambition is to establish an open TV ecosystem that 
allows any CE manufacturer to come up with its own YouView-branded device that is 
supported by any Internet service provider (ISP) and content provider. Following the special 
BT and TalkTalk boxes, Sky launched a Now TV-branded Roku streaming box allowing 
users to stream Now TV content to their TV set, and to consume content from BBC iPlayer, 
Demand 5, Spotify and Sky News (in July 2013). As YouView aims to maintain the relevance 
of free-to-air television (via Freeview) without gatekeeping, there is no subscription nor 
contract for accessing catch-up and Freeview content – albeit there is a one-off payment for 
the set-top box which may be bundled as a part of a subsidised triple play offer. 
YouView is a joint venture with seven equal partners, including broadcasters (BBC, ITV, 
Channel 4, Channel 5), ISPs (BT, TalkTalk) and DTT network infrastructure provider Arqiva 
– all partners financially committed to invest a total £126 million in the venture to cover the 
first four years of operation. The proposed industry-wide structure complied with the 
conditions of Project Kangaroo, which established an on-demand platform offering content 
from BBC worldwide, ITV and Channel 4 initially expected to launch in 2008 but blocked by 
the UK Competition Commission in 2009. The Commission ruled that a joint venture between 
the three partners, which virtually control the UK-originated content market, would restrain 
competition from existing and future on-demand providers in the market. It was further 
argued that a joint venture between closest competitors would result in a loss of rivalry, both 
at the wholesale and retail level, and that UK viewers would benefit from better on-demand 
services if the parties competed against each other. The Commission concluded that 
behavioural remedies aimed at removing the wholesaling activities of the joint venture and 
safeguarding commercially sensitive information were insufficient to mitigate the substantial 
lessening of competition in the nascent UK online video market and therefore prohibited the 
proposed joint venture. 
Although Project Canvas sounds very similar to Project Kangaroo, the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) and communications regulator Ofcom declined to investigate Project Canvas 
for its compatibility with competition law. The BBC Trust approved the development of a 
joint venture partnership and the BBC’s involvement in YouView, but found that Project 
Canvas could have a modest negative impact on the non-DTT pay-TV market. In that context, 
satellite provider Sky, cable operator Virgin and technology provider IP Vision complained 
that the project would stifle competition in the online video market, and that the Canvas 
partners would have an unfair market advantage while potentially withholding content from 
other platforms. Others held that the UK witnessed a dramatic fall in private investment in the 
IPTV business since Project Canvas was first announced (from £22 million to £1.6 million). 
According to OFT, however, the joint venture would have no role in aggregating, marketing 
or directly retailing any TV content, and each party would retain control over its content. In 
addition, Ofcom announced it would not investigate the proposed joint venture and gave 
green light to the project. The proliferation of on-demand services and streaming boxes, and 
the fact that YouView has so far been installed in over 500,000 homes in the UK suggests that 
the joint venture has not reduced competition and platform innovation in the UK online video 
market. 
 
Conclusion 
This article focused on the increasing practice of co-opetition strategies among broadcasters 
to secure their place in the online video market. In the highly competitive environment, TV 
broadcasters are pressured by a saturated advertising market and changing viewing behaviour, 
especially among the younger segments that are the most valuable for advertisers. In order to 
cope with these strategic challenges, TV broadcasters have started operating online video 
markets so as to diversify revenues and make their programming available across multiple 
devices. Converging ICT markets, marked by the entrance of powerful newcomers, require 
that TV broadcasters adapt their business models and step into a cut-throat competition 
against rivalling platforms. As the online video marketplace is global in nature, TV 
broadcasters have acted as keystones and cooperated with their closest competitors. In this 
perspective, industry-wide alliances might help partners in reaching the necessary scale to 
support the management of expensive technology platforms. So far, broadcasters have 
focused on rivalling broadcasters to form joint ventures with. Although strategic alliances 
with cable/satellite operators would allow broadcasters to benefit from the technical expertise 
CDN operators have, competitive tensions between broadcasters and distributors regarding 
retransmission payments seem hard to overcome. Theory suggests that vertical relationships 
between buyers and suppliers are complementary and less conflicting, but in practice conflicts 
of interest between broadcasters and cable/satellite operators stands in the way of a fruitful 
collaboration. An industry-wide consensus would, however, help local TV ecosystems to 
stand the competition from global online video platforms including Netflix and iTunes. 
The examples of Hulu and YouView clearly illustrate how TV broadcasters can take 
advantage of co-opetition strategies in online video markets, and how a collaboration between 
close competitors may be an opportunity for revenue and survival in turbulent times. As 
supply-side economies of scale are a central feature of media businesses, co-opetition offers 
an effective strategy for spreading risks, decreasing costs and reducing time to market. 
However, competition authorities, especially in Europe, continue to keep a close eye on 
strategic partnerships, by fear that co-opetition would result in collusive strategies that restrain 
competition and innovation. Partnerships between several broadcasters in Germany were 
struck down by antimonopoly authorities, but similar platforms were approved in the United 
States and New Zealand. We therefore question whether and to what extent the European 
regulatory approach towards supply-side cartels, in the form of joint ventures, 
disproportionally limits national TV broadcasters from fully exploiting online video services 
and claiming platform leadership in the market. This could put a burden on TV broadcasters, 
who are put at a considerable competitive disadvantage compared with global newcomers 
such as Netflix and YouTube that operate on a global scale, and could have detrimental 
effects on the provision of original, domestic programming in the European TV marketplace. 
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